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Abstract
We present the design and implementation of a typechecker for
verifying security properties of the source code of cryptographic
protocols and access control mechanisms. The underlying type
theory is a λ -calculus equipped with refinement types for express-
ing pre- and post-conditions within first-order logic. We derive
formal cryptographic primitives and represent active adversaries
within the type theory. Well-typed programs enjoy assertion-based
security properties, with respect to a realistic threat model includ-
ing key compromise. The implementation amounts to an enhanced
typechecker for the general purpose functional language F#; type-
checking generates verification conditions that are passed to an
SMT solver. We describe a series of checked examples. This is
the first tool to verify authentication properties of cryptographic
protocols by typechecking their source code.
1 Introduction
The goal of this work is to verify the security of imple-
mentation code by typing. Here we are concerned particu-
larly with authentication and authorization properties.
We develop an extended typechecker for code written
in F# (a variant of ML) [Syme et al., 2007] and annotated
with refinement types that embed logical formulas. We use
these dependent types to specify access-control and crypto-
graphic properties, as well as desired security goals. Type-
checking then ensures that the code is secure.
We evaluate our approach on code implementing autho-
rization decisions and on reference implementations of se-
curity protocols. Our typechecker verifies security proper-
ties for a realistic threat model that includes a symbolic at-
tacker, in the style of Dolev and Yao [1983], who is able
to create arbitrarily many principals, create arbitrarily many
instances of each protocol roles, send and receive network
traffic, and compromise arbitrarily many principals.
Verifying Cryptographic Implementations In earlier
work, Bhargavan et al. [2007] advocate the cryptographic
verification of reference implementations of protocols,
rather than their handwritten models, in order to mini-
mize the gap between executable and verified code. They
automatically extract models from F# code and, after
applying various program transformations, pass them to
ProVerif, a cryptographic analyzer [Blanchet, 2001, Abadi
and Blanchet, 2005]. Their approach yields verified secu-
rity for very detailed models, but also demands considerable
care in programming, in order to control the complexity of
global cryptographic analysis for giant protocols. Even if
ProVerif scales up remarkably well in practice, beyond a
few message exchanges, or a few hundred lines of F#, veri-
fication becomes long (up to a few days) and unpredictable
(with trivial code changes leading to divergence).
Cryptographic Verification meets Program Verification
In parallel with specialist tools for cryptography, verifica-
tion tools in general are also making rapid progress, and
can deal with much larger programs [see for example Flana-
gan et al., 2002, Filliaˆtre, 2003, Barnett et al., 2005, Pot-
tier and Re´gis-Gianas, 2007]. To verify the security of
programs with some cryptography, we would like to com-
bine both kinds of tools. However, this integration is del-
icate: the underlying assumptions of cryptographic mod-
els to account for active adversaries typically differ from
those made for general-purpose program verification. On
the other hand, modern applications involve a large amount
of (non-cryptographic) code and extensive libraries, some-
times already verified; we’d rather benefit from this effort.
Authorization by Typing Logic is now a well established
tool for expressing and reasoning about authorization poli-
cies. Although many systems rely on dynamic authorization
engines that evaluate logical queries against local stores of
facts and rules, it is sometimes possible to enforce policies
statically. Thus, Fournet et al. [2007a,b] treat policy en-
forcement as a type discipline; they develop their approach
for typed pi calculi, supplemented with cryptographic prim-
itives. Relying on a “says” modality in the logic, they also
account for partial trust (in logic specification) in the face of
partial compromise (in their implementations). The present
work is an attempt to develop, apply, and evaluate this ap-
proach for a general-purpose programming language.
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Outline of the Implementation Our prototype tool takes
as input module interfaces (similar to F# module interfaces
but with extended types) and module implementations (in
plain F#). It typechecks implementations against interfaces,
and also generates plain F# interfaces by erasure. Using the
F# compiler, generated interfaces and verified implementa-
tions can then be compiled as usual.
Our tool performs typechecking and partial type infer-
ence, relying on an external theorem prover for discharging
the logical conditions generated by typing. We currently use
plain first-order logic (rather than an authorization-specific
logic) and delegate its proofs to Z3 [de Moura and Bjørner,
2008], a solver for Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT).
Thus, in comparison with previous work, we still rely on an
external prover, but this prover is being developed for gen-
eral program verification, not for cryptography; also, we use
this prover locally, to discharge proof obligations at various
program locations, rather than rely on a global translation
to a cryptographic model.
Reflecting our assumptions on cryptography and other
system libraries, some modules have two implementations:
a symbolic implementation used for extended typing and
symbolic execution, and a concrete implementation used
for plain typing and distributed execution. We have ac-
cess to a collection of F# test programs already analyzed us-
ing dual implementations of cryptography [Bhargavan et al.,
2007], so we can compare our new approach to prior work
on model extraction to ProVerif. Unlike ProVerif, type-
checking requires annotations that include pre- and post-
conditions. On the other hand, these annotations can ex-
press general authorization policies, and their use makes
typechecking more compositional and predictable than the
global analysis performed by ProVerif. Moreover, type-
checking succeeds even on code involving recursion and
complex data structures.
Outline of the Theory We justify our extended type-
checker by developing a formal type theory for a core of F#:
a concurrent call-by-value λ -calculus.
To represent pre- and post-conditions, our calculus has
standard dependent types and pairs, and a form of refine-
ment types [Freeman and Pfenning, 1991, Xi and Pfenning,
1999]. A refinement type takes the form {x : T | C}; a
value M of this type is a value of type T such that the for-
mula C{M/x} holds. (Another name for the construction is
predicate subtyping [Rushby et al., 1998]; {x : T |C} is the
subtype of T characterized by the predicate C.)
To represent security properties, expressions may as-
sume and assert formulas in first-order logic. An expression
is safe when no assertion can ever fail at run time. By anno-
tating programs with suitable formulas, we formalize secu-
rity properties, such as authentication and authorization, as
expression safety.
Our F# code is written in a functional style, so pre- and
post-conditions concern data values and events represented
by logical formulas; our type system does not (and need not
for our purposes) directly support reasoning about mutable
state, such as heap-allocated structures.
Contributions First, we formalize our approach within
a typed concurrent λ -calculus. We develop a type system
with refinement types that carry logical formulas, building
on standard techniques for dependent types, and establish
its soundness.
Second, we adapt our type system to account for active
(untyped) adversaries, by extending subtyping so that all
values manipulated by the adversary can be given a spe-
cial universal type (Un). Our calculus has no built-in cryp-
tographic primitives. Instead, we show how a wide range
of cryptographic primitives can be coded (and typed) in
the calculus, using a seal abstraction, in a generalization of
the symbolic Dolev-Yao model. The corresponding robust
safety properties then follow as a corollary of type safety.
Third, experimentally, we implement our approach as an
extension of F#, and develop a new typechecker (with par-
tial type inference) based on Z3 (a fast, incomplete, first-
order logic prover).
Fourth, we evaluate our approach on a series of program-
ming examples, involving authentication and authorization
properties of protocols and applications; this indicates that
our use of refinement types is an interesting alternative to
global verification tools for cryptography, especially for the
verification of executable reference implementations.
An online technical report provides details, proofs, and
examples omitted from this version of the paper.
2 A Language with Refinement Types
Our calculus is an assembly of standard parts: call-
by-value dependent functions, dependent pairs, sums, iso-
recursive types, message-passing concurrency, refinement
types, subtyping, and a universal type Un to model at-
tacker knowledge. This is essentially the Fixpoint Calculus
(FPC) [Gunter, 1992], augmented with concurrency and re-
finement types. Hence, we adopt the name Refined Concur-
rent FPC, or RCF for short. This section introduces its syn-
tax, semantics, and type system (apart from Un), together
with an example application. Section 3 introduces Un and
applications to cryptographic protocols. (Any ambiguities
in the informal presentation should be clarified by the se-
mantics in Appendix B and the type system in Section 4.)
Expressions, Evaluation, and Safety An expression rep-
resents a concurrent, message-passing computation, which
may return a value. A state of the computation consists of
(1) a multiset of expressions being evaluated in parallel;
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(2) a multiset of messages sent on channels but not yet re-
ceived; and (3) the log, a multiset of assumed formulas.
The multisets of evaluating expressions and unread mes-
sages model a configuration of a concurrent or distributed
system; the log is a notional central store of logical formu-
las, used only for specifying correctness properties.
We write S |=C to mean that a formula C logically fol-
lows from a set S of formulas. In our implementation, C
is some formula in (untyped) first-order logic with equali-
ties M = N interpreted as syntactic identity between values.
(Appendix A lists the (standard) syntax.)
We assume collections of names, variables, and type
variables. A name is an identifier, generated at run time,
for a channel, while a variable is a placeholder for a value.
If φ is a phrase of syntax, we write φ{M/x} for the out-
come of substituting a value M for each free occurrence of
the variable x in φ . We identify syntax up to the capture-
avoiding renaming of bound names and variables. We write
fnfv(φ) for the set of names and variables occurring free in
a phrase of syntax φ .
Syntax of Values and Expressions:
v ::= a | x name or variable
h ::= inl | inr | fold constructor
M,N ::= value
v name or variable
() unit






M = N syntactic equality
let x = A in B let (scope of x is B)
let (x,y) = M in A pair split (scope of x, y is A)
match M with constructor match
h x→ A else B (scope of x is A)
(νa)A restriction (scope of a is A)
A  B fork
M!N transmission of N on channel M
M? receive message off channel
assume C assumption of formula C
assert C assertion of formula C
To evaluate M, return M at once. To evaluate M N, if
M = fun x → A, evaluate A{N/x}. To evaluate M = N,
if the two values M and N are the same, return true 4=
inr(); otherwise, return false 4= inl(). To evaluate let x =
A in B, first evaluate A; if evaluation returns a value M,
evaluate B{M/x}. To evaluate let (x1,x2) = M in A, if
M = (N1,N2), evaluate A{N1/x1}{N2/x2}. To evaluate
match M with h x→ A else B, if M = h N for some N,
evaluate A{N/x}; otherwise, evaluate B.
To evaluate (νa)A, generate a globally fresh channel
name c, and evaluate A{c/a}. To evaluate A  B, start a
parallel thread to evaluate A (whose return value will be dis-
carded), and evaluate B. To evaluate M!N, if M = c for some
name c, emit message N on channel c, and return () at once.
To evaluate M?, if M = c for some name c, block until some
message N is on channel c, remove N from the channel, and
return N.
To evaluate assume C, add C to the log, and return (). To
evaluate assert C, return (). If S |=C, where S is the set of
logged formulas, we say the assertion succeeds; otherwise,
we say the assertion fails. Either way, it always returns ().
Expression Safety:
An expression A is safe if and only if, in all evaluations of A,
all assertions succeed. (see Appendix B for formal details.)
Types and Subtyping We assume a collection of type





Πx : T.U dependent function type (scope of x is U)
Σx : T.U dependent pair type (scope of x is U)
T +U disjoint sum type
µα.T iso-recursive type (scope of α is T )
(T )chan channel type
{x : T |C} refinement type (scope of x is C)
{C} 4= { : unit |C} ok-type
(The notation denotes an anonymous variable that by con-
vention occurs nowhere else.)
A value of type unit is the unit value (). A value of type
Πx : T.U is a function M such that if N has type T , then M N
has type U{N/x}. A value of type Σx : T.U is a pair (M,N)
such that M has type T and N has type U{M/x}. A value
of type T +U is either inl M where M has type T , or inr N
where N has type U . A value of type µα.T is a construction
fold M, where M has the (unfolded) type T{µα.T/α}. A
value of type (T )chan is a name c such that for any trans-
mission c!M on c, message M has type T . A value of type
{x : T | C} is a value M of type T such that the formula
C{M/x} follows from the log.
As usual, we can define syntax-directed typing rules for
checking that the value of an expression is of type T , written
E ` A : T , where E is a typing environment. The environ-
ment tracks the types of variables and names in scope. We
write ∅ for the empty environment.
The core principle of our system is safety by typing:
Theorem 1 (Safety by Typing) If ∅ ` A : T then A is safe.
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Section 4 has all the typing rules. The majority are stan-
dard. Here, we explain the intuitions for the rules concern-
ing refinement types, assumptions, and assertions.
The judgment E |=C means C is deducible from the for-
mulas mentioned in refinement types in E. For example:
• If E includes y : {x : T |C} then E |=C{y/x}.
Consider the refinement types T1 = {x1 : T | P(x1)} and
T2 = {x2 : unit | ∀z.P(z)⇒ Q(z)}. If E = (y1 : T1,y2 : T2)
then E |= Q(y1) (via the rule above plus first-order logic).
The introduction rule for refinement types is as follows.
• If E `M : T and E |=C{M/x} then E `M : {x : T |C}.
A special case of refinement is an ok-type, written {C},
and short for { : unit | C}: a type of tokens that a for-
mula holds. For example, up to variable renaming, T2 =
{∀z.P(z)⇒ Q(z)}. The specialized rules for ok-types are:
• If E includes x : {C} then E |=C.
• A value of type {C} is (), a token that C holds.
The type system includes a subtype relation E ` T <: T ′,
and the usual subsumption rule:
• If E ` A : T and E ` T <: T ′ then E ` A : T ′.
Refinement relates to subtyping as follows. (To avoid
confusion, note that True is a logical formula, which always
holds, while true is a Boolean value, defined as inr ()).
• If T <: T ′ and C |=C′ then {x : T |C}<: {x : T ′ |C′}.
• {x : T | True}<:> T .
For example, {x : T |C}<: {x : T | True}<: T .
We typecheck assume and assert as follows.
• E ` assume C : {C}.
• If E |=C then E ` assert C : unit.
By typing the result of assume as {C}, we track that C can
subsequently be assumed to hold. Conversely, for a well-
typed assert to be guaranteed to succeed, we must check
that C holds in E. This is sound because when typecheck-
ing any A in E, the formulas deducible from E are a lower
bound on the formulas in the log whenever A is evaluated.
Formal Interpretation of our Typechecker We interpret
a large class of F# expressions and modules within our cal-
culus. To enable a compact presentation of the semantics of
RCF, there are two significant differences between expres-
sions in these languages. First, the formal syntax of RCF is
in an intermediate, reduced form (reminiscent of A-normal
form [Sabry and Felleisen, 1993]) where let x=A in B is the
only construct to allow sequential evaluation of expressions.
As usual, A;B is short for let = A in B. More notably, if
A and B are proper expressions rather than being values, the
application A B is short for let f = A in (let x = B in f x).
In general, the use in F# of arbitrary expressions in place of
values can be interpreted by inserting suitable lets.
The second main difference is that the RCF syntax for
communication and concurrency ((νa)A and A  B and M?
and M!N) is in the style of a process calculus. In F# we
express communication and concurrency via a small library
of functions, which is interpreted within RCF as follows.
Functions for Communication and Concurrency:
chan
4= fun x→ (νa)a create new channel
send
4= fun c→ fun x→ (c!x  ()) send x on c
recv
4= fun c→ let x = c? in x block for x on c
fork
4= fun f → ( f ()  ()) run f in parallel
We also assume standard encodings of strings, numeric
types, Booleans, tuples, records, algebraic types (including
lists) and pattern-matching, and recursive functions. RCF
lacks polymorphism, but by duplicating definitions at multi-
ple monomorphic types we can recover the effect of having
polymorphic definitions.
We use the following notations for functions with pre-
conditions, and non-empty tuples (instead of directly using
the core syntax for dependent function and pair types). We
usually omit conditions of the form {True} in examples.
Derived Notation for Functions and Tuples:
[x1 : T1]{C1}→U 4=Πx1 : {x1 : T1 |C1}.U
(x1 : T1 ∗ · · · ∗ xn : Tn){C} 4={
Σx1 : T1. . . .Σxn−1 : Tn−1. {xn : Tn |C} if n> 0
{C} otherwise
To treat assume and assert as F# library functions, we
follow the convention that constructor applications are in-
terpreted as formulas (as well as values). If h is an algebraic
type constructor of arity n, we treat h as a predicate symbol
of arity n, so that h(M1, . . . ,Mn) is a formula.
All of our example code is extracted from two kinds of
source files: either extended typed interfaces (.fs7) that de-
clare types, values, and policies; or the corresponding F#
implementation modules (.fs) that define them.
We sketch how to interpret interfaces and modules as
tuple types and expressions. In essence, an interface is a
sequence val x1 : T1 . . . val xn : Tn of value declarations,
which we interpret by the tuple type (x1 : T1 ∗ · · · ∗ xn : Tn).
A module is a sequence let x1 = A1 . . . let xn = An of value
definitions, which we interpret by the expression let x1 =
A1 in . . . let xn = An in (x1, . . . ,xn). If A and T are the in-
terpretations of a module and an interface, our tool checks
whether A : T . Any type declarations are simply inter-
preted as abbreviations for types, while a policy statement
assume C is treated as a declaration val x : {C} plus a defi-
nition let x = assume C for some fresh x.
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Example: Access Control in Partially-Trusted Code
This example illustrates static enforcement of file access
control policies in code that is typechecked but not nec-
essarily trusted, such as applets or plug-ins [Pottier et al.,
2001, Abadi and Fournet, 2003, Abadi, 2006].
We first declare a type for the logical facts in our policy.
We interpret each of its constructors as a predicate symbol:
here, we have two basic access rights, for reading and writ-
ing a given file, and a property stating that a file is public.
type facts =
CanRead of string // read access
| CanWrite of string // write access
| PublicFile of string // some file attribute
We use these facts to give restrictive types to sensitive
primitives. For instance, the declarations
val read: file:string{CanRead(file)}→string
val delete: file:string{CanWrite(file)}→unit
demand that the function read be called only in contexts
that have previously established the fact CanRead A for its
string argument A (and similarly for write). These demands
are enforced at compile time, so in F# the function read just
has type string→string and its implementation may be left
unchanged.
Library writers are trusted to include suitable assume
statements. They may declare policies, in the form of log-
ical deduction rules, declaring for instance that every file
that is writable is also readable:
assume ∀x. CanWrite(x)⇒CanRead(x)
and they may program helper functions that establish new
facts. For instance, they may declare
val publicfile: file : string→unit{ PublicFile(file) }
assume ∀x. PublicFile(x)⇒CanRead(x)
and implement publicfile as a partial function that dynami-
cally checks its filename argument.
let publicfile f =
if f = "C:/public/README" then assume (PublicFile(f))
else failwith "not a public file"
where let f x = A is short for let f = fun x→ A.
The F# library function failwith throws an exception, so
it never returns and can safely be given the polymorphic
type string→α , where α can be instantiated to any RCF
type. (We also coded more realistic dynamic checks, based
on dynamic lookups in mutable, refinement-typed, access-
control lists. We omit their code for brevity.)
To illustrate our code, consider a few sample files, one
of them writable:
let pwd = "C:/etc/password"
let readme = "C:/public/README"
let tmp = "C:/temp/tempfile"
let = assume (CanWrite(tmp))
Typechecking the test code below reports two type errors:
let test =
delete tmp; // ok
delete pwd; // type error
let v1 = read tmp in // ok, using 1st logical rule
let v2 = read readme in // type error
publicfile readme; let v3 = read readme in () // ok
For instance, the second delete yields the error “Cannot es-
tablish formula CanWrite(pwd) at acls.fs(39,9)-(39,12).”
In the last line, the call to publicfile dynamically tests its
argument, ensuring PublicFile(readme) whenever the final
expression read readme is evaluated. This fact is recorded
in the environment for typing the final expression.
From the viewpoint of fully-trusted code, our inter-
face can be seen as a self-inflicted discipline—indeed, one
may simply assume ∀x.CanRead(x). In contrast, partially-
trusted code (such as mobile code) would not contain any
assume. By typing this code against our library interface,
possibly with a policy adapted to the origin of the code, the
host is guaranteed that this code cannot call read or write
without first obtaining the appropriate right.
Although access control for files mostly relies on dy-
namic checks (ACLs, permissions, and so forth), a static
typing discipline has advantages for programming partially-
trusted code: as long as the program typechecks, one can
safely re-arrange code to more efficiently perform costly dy-
namic checks. For example, one may hoist a check outside
a loop, or move it to the point a function is created, rather
than called, or move it to a point where it is convenient to
handle dynamic security exceptions.
In the code below, for instance, the function reader can
be called to access the content of file readme in any context
with no further run time check.
let test higher order =
let reader = (publicfile readme; (fun ()→ read readme)) in
let v4 = read readme in // type error
let v5 = reader () in () // ok
Similarly, we programmed (and typed) a function that
merges the content of all files included in a list, under the
assumption that all these files are readable, declared as
val merge: (file:string{ CanRead(file) }) list→string
where list is a type constructor for lists, with a standard im-
plementation typed in RCF.
3 Modelling Cryptographic Protocols
Following Bhargavan et al. [2007], we start with plain F#
functions that create instances of each role of the protocol
(such as client or server). The protocols make use of vari-
ous libraries (including cryptographic functions, explained
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below) to communicate messages on channels that repre-
sent the public network. We model the whole protocol as an
F# module, interpreted as before as an expression that ex-
ports the functions representing the protocol roles, as well
as the network channel [Sumii and Pierce, 2007]. We ex-
press authentication properties (correspondences [Woo and
Lam, 1993]) by embedding suitable assume and assert ex-
pressions within the code of the protocol roles.
The goal is to verify that these properties hold in spite
of an active opponent able to send, receive, and apply cryp-
tography to messages on network channels [Needham and
Schroeder, 1978]. We model the opponent as some arbi-
trary (untyped) expression O which is given access to the
protocol and knows the network channels [Abadi and Gor-
don, 1999]. The idea is that O may use the communication
and concurrency features of RCF to create arbitrary parallel
instances of the protocol roles, and to send and receive mes-
sages on the network channels, in an attempt to force failure
of an assert in protocol code. Hence, our formal goal is ro-
bust safety, that no assert fails, despite the best efforts of an
arbitrary opponent.
Formal Threat Model: Opponents and Robust Safety
An expression O is an opponent iff O contains no occur-
rence of assert and each type annotation within O is Un.
An expression A is robustly safe iff the application O A is
safe for all opponents O.
(An opponent must contain no assert, or less it could vacu-
ously falsify safety. The constraint on type annotations is a
technical convenience; it does not affect the expressiveness
of opponents.)
Typing the Opponent To allow type-based reasoning
about the opponent, we introduce a universal type Un of
data known to the opponent, much as in earlier work [Abadi,
1999, Gordon and Jeffrey, 2003a]. By definition, Un is
type equivalent to (both a subtype and a supertype of) all
of the following types: unit, (Πx : Un. Un), (Σx : Un. Un),
(Un+Un), (µα.Un), and (Un)chan. Hence, we obtain op-
ponent typability, that O : Un for all opponents O.
It is useful to characterize two kinds of type: public types
(of data that may flow to the opponent) and tainted types (of
data that may flow from the opponent).
Public and Tainted Types:
Let a type T be public if and only if T <: Un.
Let a type T be tainted if and only if Un<: T .
We can show that refinement types satisfy the following
kinding rules. (Section 4 has kinding rules for the other
types, following prior work [Gordon and Jeffrey, 2003b].)
• E ` {x : T |C}<: Un iff E ` T <: Un
• E ` Un<: {x : T |C} iff E ` Un<: T and E,x : T |=C
Consider the type {x : string | CanRead(x)}. According
to the rules above, this type is public, because string is pub-
lic, but it is only tainted if CanRead(x) holds for all x. If we
have a value M of this type we can conclude CanRead(M).
The type cannot be tainted, for if it were, we could conclude
CanRead(M) for any M chosen by the opponent. It is the
presence of such non-trivial refinement types that prevents
all types from being equivalent to Un.
Verification of protocols versus an arbitrary opponent is
based on a principle of robust safety by typing.
Theorem 2 (Robust Safety by Typing) If ∅ ` A : Un then
A is robustly safe.
To apply the principle, if expression A and type T are
the RCF interpretations of a protocol module and a protocol
interface, it suffices by subsumption to check that A : T and
T is public. The latter amounts to checking that Ti is public
for each declaration val xi : Ti in the protocol interface.
A Cryptographic Library We provide various libraries
to support distributed programming. They include polymor-
phic functions for producing and parsing network represen-
tations of values, declared as
val pickle: x:α → (p:α pickled)
val unpickle: p:α pickled→ (x:α )
and for messaging: addr is the type of TCP duplex connec-
tions, established by calling connect and listen, and used by
calling send and recv. All these functions are public.
The cryptographic library provides a typed interface to
a range of primitives, including hash functions, symmetric
encryption, asymmetric encryption, and digital signatures.
We detail the interface for HMACSHA1, a keyed hash func-
tion, used in our examples to build messages authentication
codes (MACs). This interface declares
type α hkey = HK of α pickled Seal
type hmac = HMAC of Un
val mkHKey: unit→α hkey
val hmacsha1: α hkey→α pickled→hmac
val hmacsha1Verify: α hkey→Un→hmac→α pickled
where hmac is the type of hashes and α hkey is the type of
keys used to compute hashes for values of type α .
The function mkHKey generate a fresh key (informally
fresh random bytes). The function hmacsha1 computes the
joint hash of a key and a value with matching types α . The
function hmacsha1Verify verifies whether the joint hash of
a key and a value (a priori the pickled representation of any
type β ) match some given hash. If verification succeeds,
this value is returned, now with the type α indicated in the
key. Otherwise, an exception is raised.
Although keyed-hash verification is concretely imple-
mented by recomputing the hash and comparing it to the
given hash, this would not meet its typed interface: assume
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α is the refinement type 〈x:string〉{CanRead(x)}. In order
to hash a string x, one needs to prove CanRead(x) as a pre-
condition for calling hmacsha1. Conversely, when receiv-
ing a keyed hash of x, one would like to obtain CanRead(x)
as a postcondition of the verification—indeed, the result
type of hmacsha1Verify guarantees it. At the end of this
section, we describe a well-typed symbolic implementation
of this interface.
Example: A Protocol based on MACs Our first crypto-
graphic example implements a basic one-message protocol
with a message authentication code (MAC) computed as a
shared-keyed hash; it is a variant of a protocol described
and verified in earlier work [Bhargavan et al., 2007].
We present snippets of the protocol code to illustrate our
typechecking method; Appendix C lists the full source code
for a similar, but more general protocol. We begin with a
typed interface, declaring three types: event for specifying
our authentication property; content for authentic payloads;
and message for messages exchanged on a public network.
type event = Send of string // a type of logical predicate
type content = x:string{Send(x)} // a string refinement
type message = (string ∗ hmac) pickled // a wire format
The interface also declares functions, client and server, for
invoking the two roles of the protocol.
val addr : (string ∗ hmac, unit) addr // a public server address
private val hk: content hkey // a shared secret
private val make: content hkey→content→message
val client: string→unit // start a client
private val check: content hkey→message→content
val server: unit→unit // start a server
The client and server functions share two values: a pub-
lic network address addr where the server listens, and a
shared secret key hk. Given a string argument s, client calls
the make function to build a protocol message by calling
hmacsha1 hk (pickled s). Conversely, on receiving a mes-
sage at addr, server calls the check function to check the
message by calling hmacsha1Verify.
In the interface, values marked as priv may occur only in
typechecked implementations. Conversely, the other values
(addr, client, server) are available to the opponent, as well
as Un-typed values declared in libraries.
Authentication is expressed using a single event Send(s)
recording that the string s has genuinely been sent by the
client—formally, that client(s) has been called. This event is
embedded in a refinement type, content, the type of strings s
such that Send(s). Thus, following the type declarations for
make and check, this event is a pre-condition for building
the message, and a post-condition after successfully check-
ing the message.
Consider the following code for client and server:
let client text =
assume (Send(text)); // privileged, carefully review
let c = connect addr in
send c (make hk text)
let server () =
let c = listen addr in
let text = check hk (recv c) in
assert(Send text) // guaranteed by typing
The calls to assume before building the message and to
assert after checking the message have no effect at run time
(the implementations of these functions simply return ())
but they are used to specify our security policy. In the termi-
nology of cryptographic protocols, assume marks a “begin”
event, while assert marks an “end” event.
Here, the server code expects that the call to check only
returns text values previously passed as arguments to client.
This guarantee follows from typing, by relying on the types
of the shared key and cryptographic functions. On the other
hand, this guarantee does not presume any particular cryp-
tographic implementation—indeed, simple variants of our
protocol may achieve the same authentication guarantee, for
example, by authenticated encryption or digital signature.
Conversely, some implementation mistakes would result
in a compile-time type error indicating a possible attack.
For instance, removing priv from the declaration of the au-
thentication key hk, or attempting to leak hk within client
would not be type-correct; indeed, this would introduce an
attack on our desired authentication property.
Example: Principals and Compromise We now extend
our example with multiple principals, with a shared key be-
tween each pair of principals. Hence, the keyed hash au-
thenticates not only the message content, but also the sender
and the intended receiver. The full implementation is in Ap-
pendix C; here we give only the types.
We represent principal names as strings; Send events are
now parameterized by the sending and receiving principals.
type prin = string
type event = Send of (prin ∗ prin ∗ string) | Leak of prin
type (;a:prin,b:prin) content = x:string{ Send(a,b,x) }
The second event Leak is used in our handling of princi-
pal compromise, as described below. The type definition
of content has two value parameters, a and b; they bind
expression variables in the type being defined, much like
type parameters bind type variables. (Value parameters ap-
pear after type parameters, separated by a semicolon; here,
content has no type parameters before the semicolon.)
We store the keys in a (typed, list-based) private database
containing entries of the form (a,b,k) where k is a symmetric
key of type (;a,b)content shared between a and b.
val genKey: prin→prin→unit
private val getKey: a:
string→b:string→ ((;a,b) content) hkey
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Trusted code can call getKey a b to retrieve a key shared
between a and b. Both trusted and opponent code can also
call genKey a b to trigger the insertion of a fresh key into
the database.
To model the possibility of key leakage, we allow oppo-
nent code to obtain a key by calling the function leak:
assume ∀a,b,x. ( Leak(a) )⇒Send(a,b,x)
val leak:
a:prin→b:prin→ (unit{ Leak(a) }) ∗ ((;a,b) content) hkey
This function first assumes Leak(a), as recorded in its result
type, then calls getKey a b and returns the key. Since the
opponent gets a key shared between a and b, it can generate
seemingly authentic messages on a’s behalf; accordingly,
we declare the policy that Send(a,b,x) holds for any x af-
ter the compromise of a, so that leak can be given a public
type—without this policy, a subtyping check fails during
typing.
Implementing Formal Cryptography Morris [1973] de-
scribes sealing, a programming language mechanism to
provide “authentication and limited access.” Sumii and
Pierce [2007] provide a primitive semantics for sealing
within a λ -calculus, and observe the close correspondence
between sealing and various formal characterizations of
symmetric-key cryptography.
In our notation, a seal k for a type T is a pair of func-
tions: the seal function for k, of type T → Un, and the un-
seal function for k, of type Un→ T . The seal function, when
applied to M, wraps up its argument as a sealed value, infor-
mally written {M}k in this discussion. This is the only way
to construct {M}k. The unseal function, when applied to
{M}k, unwraps its argument and returns M. This is the only
way to retrieve M from {M}k. Sealed values are opaque; in
particular, the seal k cannot be retrieved from {M}k.
We declare a type of seals, and a function mkSeal to cre-
ate a fresh seal, as follows.
type αSeal = (α →Un) ∗ (Un→α )
val mkSeal: unit→αSeal
To implement a seal k, we maintain a list of pairs
[(M1,a1); . . . ;(Mn,an)]. The list records all the values Mi
that have so far been sealed with k. Each ai is a fresh name
representing the sealed value {Mi}k. The list grows as more
values are sealed; we associate a channel s with the seal k,
and store the current list as the one and only message on s.
We maintain the invariant that both the Mi and the ai are
pairwise distinct: the list is a one-to-one correspondence.
The function mkSeal below creates a fresh seal, by gen-
erating a fresh channel s; the seal itself is the pair of func-
tions (seal s,unseal s). The code uses the channel-based
abbreviations chan, send, and recv displayed in Section 2.
The code also relies on library functions for list lookups:
the function first, of type (α→β option)→α list→β option,
takes as parameters a function and a list; it applies the func-
tion to the elements of the list, and returns its first non-None
result, if any; otherwise it returns None. This function is
applied to a pair-filtering function left, defined as let left z (
x,y)= if z = x then Some y else None, to retrieve the first ai
associated with the value being sealed, if any, and is used
symmetrically with a function right to retrieve the first Mi
associated with the value being unsealed, if any.
type αSealChan = ((α ∗ Un) list) Pi.chan
let seal: αSealChan→α→Un = fun s M→
let state = recv s in match first (left M) state with
| Some(a)→send s state; a
| None→
let a: Un = Pi.name "a" in
send s ((M,a)::state); a
let unseal: αSealChan→Un→α = fun s a→
let state = recv s in match first (right a) state with
| Some(M)→send s state; M
| None→ failwith "not a sealed value"
let mkSeal () : αSeal =
let s:α SealChan = chan "seal" in
send s []; (seal s, unseal s)
Within RCF, we derive formal versions of cryptographic
operations, in the spirit of Dolev and Yao [1983], but based
on sealing rather than algebra. Our technique depends
on being within a calculus with functional values. Thus,
in contrast with previous work in cryptographic pi calculi
[Gordon and Jeffrey, 2003b, Fournet et al., 2007b] where
all cryptographic functions were defined and typed as prim-
itives, we can now implement these functions and retrieve
their typing rules by typechecking their implementations.
As an example, we derive a formal model of the func-
tions we use for HMACSHA1 in terms of seals as follows.
let mkHKey ():α hkey = HK (mkSeal ())
let hmacsha1 (HK key) text = HMAC (fst key text)
let hmacsha1Verify (HK key) text (HMAC h) =
let x:α pickled = snd key h in
if x = text then x else failwith "hmac verify failed"
Similarly, we derive functions for symmetric encryption
(AES), asymmetric encryption (RSA), and digital signa-
tures (RSASHA1).
4 A Type System for Robust Safety
We describe the full type system.
Judgments, and Syntax of Environments:
E `  E is syntactically well-formed
E ` T in E, type T is syntactically well-formed
E |=C formula C is derivable from E
E ` T :: ν in E, type T has kind ν ∈ {pub, tnt}
E ` T <: U in E, type T is a subtype of type U
E ` A : T in E, expression A has type T
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Syntax of Typing Environments:
µ ::= environment entry
α type variable
α :: {pub, tnt} kinding
a : (T )chan name (of channel type)
x : T variable (of any type)
E ::= µ1, . . . ,µn environment
A name can only have a channel type. If E = µ1, . . . ,µn
we write µ ∈ E to mean that µ = µi for some i ∈ 1..n. We
write T <:> T ′ for T <: T ′ and T ′ <: T . Let dom(E) be the
set of type variables, names, and variables defined in E. Let
fnfv(E) =
⋃{fnfv(T ) | (u : T ) ∈ E}.









E `  fnfv(C)⊆ dom(E) forms(E) |=C
E |=C
forms(E) 4= {C{y/x}}∪ forms(y : T ) if E = (y : {x : T |C})forms(E1)∪ forms(E2) if E = (E1,E2)∅ otherwise
The next set of rules axiomatizes the sets of public and
tainted types, of data that can flow to or from the opponent.
Kinding Rules: E ` T :: ν for ν ∈ {pub, tnt}
E `  (α :: {pub, tnt}) ∈ E
E ` α :: ν
E ` 
E ` unit :: ν
E ` T :: tnt
E,x : T `U :: pub
E ` (Πx : T.U) :: pub
E ` T :: pub
E,x : T `U :: tnt
E ` (Πx : T.U) :: tnt
E ` T :: ν E,x : T `U :: ν
E ` (Σx : T.U) :: ν
E ` T :: ν E `U :: ν
E ` (T +U) :: ν
E,α :: {pub, tnt} ` T :: pub
E,α :: {pub, tnt} ` T :: tnt
E ` (µα.T ) :: ν
E ` T :: pub
E ` T :: tnt
E ` (T )chan :: ν
E ` {x : T |C} E ` T :: pub
E ` {x : T |C} :: pub
E ` T :: tnt E,x : T |=C
E ` {x : T |C} :: tnt
The following rules of subtyping are standard [Cardelli,
1986, Pierce and Sangiorgi, 1996, Aspinall and Com-
pagnoni, 2001]. The two rules for subtyping refinement
types are the same as in Sage [Gronski et al., 2006].
Subtype: E ` T <: U
E ` T :: pub E `U :: tnt
E ` T <: U
E `  α ∈ dom(E)
E ` α <: α
E ` 
E ` unit<: unit
E ` T ′ <: T E,x : T ′ `U <: U ′
E ` (Πx : T.U)<: (Πx : T ′.U ′)
E ` T <: T ′ E,x : T `U <: U ′
E ` (Σx : T.U)<: (Σx : T ′.U ′)
E ` T <: T ′ E `U <: U ′
E ` (T +T ′)<: (U +U ′)
E,α ` T <:> T ′
E ` (µα.T )<: (µα.T ′)
E ` T <: T ′ E ` T ′ <: T
E ` (T )chan<: (T ′)chan
E ` {x : T |C} E ` T <: T ′
E ` {x : T |C}<: T ′
E ` T <: T ′ E,x : T |=C
E ` T <: {x : T ′ |C}
The universal type Un is to be type equivalent to all types
that are both public and tainted; we (arbitrarily) define Un 4=
(unit)chan. We can show that this definition satisfies the
intended meaning: E ` T :: pub iff E ` T <: Un, and E `
T :: tnt iff E ` Un<: T .
The following congruence rule for refinement types is
derivable from the two primitive rules for refinement types.
We also list the special case for ok-types.
E ` T <: T ′ E,x : {x : T |C} |=C′
E ` {x : T |C}<: {x : T ′ |C′}
E, : {C} |=C′
E ` {C}<: {C′}
Next, we present the rules for typing values. The rule for
constructions h M depends on an auxiliary relation h : (T,U)
that delimits the possible argument T and result U of each
constructor h.
Rules for Values: E ` A : T
E `  (v : T ) ∈ E
E ` v : T
E ` 
E ` () : unit
E,x : T ` A : U
E ` fun x→ A : (Πx : T.U)
E `M : T E ` N : U{M/x}
E ` (M,N) : (Σx : T.U)
h : (T,U) E `M : T E `U
E ` h M : U
E `M : T E |=C{M/x}
E `M : {x : T |C}
inl:(T,T+U) inr:(U,T+U) fold:(T{µα.T/α},µα.T )
Our final set of rules is for typing arbitrary expressions.
In the rules for pattern-matching pairs and constructions, we
use equations within refinement types to track information
about the matched variables.
Rules for Expressions: E ` A : T
E ` A : T E ` T <: T ′
E ` A : T ′
E `M : (Πx : T.U) E ` N : T
E `M N : U{N/x}
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E `M : (Σx : T.U)
E,x : T,y : U, : {(x,y) = M} ` A : V
{x,y}∩ fv(V ) =∅
E ` let (x,y) = M in A : V
E `M : T h : (H,T )
E,x : H, : {h x = M} ` A : U x /∈ fv(U)
E, : {∀x.h x 6= M} ` B : U
E `match M with h x→ A else B : U
E `M : T E ` N : U
E `M = N : {b : bool | b = true⇔M = N}
E `  fnfv(C)⊆ dom(E)
E ` assume C : {C}
E |=C
E ` assert C : unit
E ` A : T E,x : T ` B : U x /∈ fv(U)
E ` let x = A in B : U
E,a : (T )chan ` A : U a /∈ fn(U)
E ` (νa)A : U
E `M : (T )chan E ` N : T
E `M!N : unit
E `M : (T )chan
E `M? : T
E, : {A2} ` A1 : T1 E, : {A1} ` A2 : T2
E ` (A1  A2) : T2
The final rule, for A1  A2, relies on an auxiliary function
to extract the top-level formulas from A2 for use while type-
checking A1, and to extract the top-level formulas from A1
for use while typechecking A2. The function A returns a
formula representing the conjunction of each C occurring
in a top-level assume C in an expression A, with restricted
names existentially quantified.
Formula Extraction: A
(νa)A = (∃a.A) A1  A2 = (A1∧A2)
let x = A1 in A2 = A1 assume C =C
A = True if A matches no other rule
5 Implementing Refinement Types for F#
We implement a typechecker that takes as input a series
of extended RCF interface files and F# implementation files
and, for every implementation file, perform the following
tasks: (1) typecheck the implementation against its RCF in-
terface, and any other RCF interfaces it may use; (2) kind-
check its RCF interface, ensuring that every public value
declaration has a public type; and then (3) generate a plain
F# interface by erasure from its RCF interface. The pro-
gramming of these tasks almost directly follows from our
type theory. In the rest of this section, we only highlight
some design choices and implementation decisions.
Handling F# Language Features Our typechecker pro-
cesses F# programs with many more features than the cal-
culus of Section 2. Thus, type definitions also feature
mutual recursion, algebraic datatypes, type abbreviations,
and record types; value definitions also feature mutual re-
cursion, polymorphism, nested patterns in let- and match-
expression, records, exceptions, and mutable references. As
described in Section 2, these constructs can be expanded out
to simpler types and expressions within RCF.
Annotating Standard Libraries Any F# program may
use the set of pervasive types and functions in the standard
library; this library includes operations on built-in types
such as strings, Booleans, lists, options, and references, and
also provides system functions such as reading and writing
files and pretty-printing. Hence, to check a program, we
must provide the typechecker with declarations for all the
standard library functions and types it uses. When the types
for these functions are F# types, we can simply use the F#
interfaces provided with the library and trust their imple-
mentation. However, if the program relies on extended RCF
types for some library functions, we must provide our own
RCF interface. For example, the following code declare two
functions on lists:
assume
(∀x, u. Mem(x,x::u)) ∧
(∀x, y, u. Mem(x,u)⇒Mem(x,y::u)) ∧
(∀x, u. Mem(x,u)⇒ (∃y, v. u = y::v ∧ (x = y ∨Mem(x,v))))
val mem: x:α →u:α list→ r:bool{r=true⇒Mem(x,u)}
val find: (α →bool)→ (u:α list→ r:α { Mem(r,u) })
We declare an inductive predicate Mem for list member-
ship and use it to annotate the two library functions for list
membership (mem) and list lookup (find). Having defined
these extended RCF types, we have a choice: we may either
trust that the library implementation satisfies these types,
or reimplement these functions and typecheck them. For
lists, we reimplement (and re-typecheck) these functions;
for other library modules such as String and Printf, we trust
the F# implementation.
Implementing Trusted Libraries In addition to the stan-
dard library, our F# programs rely on libraries for cryptog-
raphy and networking. We write their concrete implemen-
tations on top of .NET Framework classes. For instance, we
define keyed hash functions as:
open System.Security.Cryptography
type α hkey = bytes
type hmac = bytes
let mkHKey () = mkNonce()
let hmacsha1 (k:α hkey) (x:bytes) =
(new HMACSHA1 (k)).ComputeHash x
let hmacsha1Verify (k:α hkey) (x:bytes) (h:bytes) =
let hh = (new HMACSHA1 (k)).ComputeHash x in
if h = hh then x else failwith "hmac verify failed"
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F# Definitions F# Declarations RCF Declarations Analysis Time Z3 Obligations
Typed Libraries 440 lines 125 lines 146 lines 12.1s 12
Access Control (Section 2) 104 lines 16 lines 34 lines 8.3s 16
MAC Protocol (Section 3) 40 lines 9 lines 12 lines 2.5s 3
Logs and Queries 37 lines 10 lines 16 lines 2.8s 6
Principals & Compromise (Section 3) 48 lines 13 lines 26 lines 3.1s 12
Flexible Signatures (Section 6) 167 lines 25 lines 52 lines 14.6s 28
Table 1. Typechecking Example Programs
Similarly, the network send and recv are implemented using
TCP sockets (and not typechecked in RCF).
We also write symbolic implementations for cryptogra-
phy and networking, coded using seals and channels, and
typechecked against their RCF interfaces. These implemen-
tations can also be used to compile and execute programs
symbolically, sending messages on local channels (instead
of TCP sockets) and computing sealed values (instead of
bytes); this is convenient for testing and debugging, as one
can inspect the symbolic structure of all messages.
Type Annotations and Partial Type Inference Type in-
ference for dependently-typed calculi, such as RCF, is un-
decidable in general. For top-level value definitions, we re-
quire that all types be explicitly declared. For subexpres-
sions, our typechecker performs type inference using stan-
dard unification-based techniques for plain F# types (poly-
morphic functions, algebraic datatypes) but it may require
annotations for types carrying formulas.
Generating Proof Obligations for Z3 Following our
typing rules, our typechecker must often establish that
a condition follows from the current typing environment
(such as when typing function applications and kinding
value declarations). If the formula trivially holds, the type-
checker discharges it; for more involved first-order-logic
formulas, it generates a proof obligation in the Simplify for-
mat [Detlefs et al., 2005] and invokes the Z3 prover. Since
Z3 is incomplete, it sometimes fails to prove a valid for-
mula.
The translation from RCF typing environments to Sim-
plify involves logical re-codings. Thus, constructors are
coded as injective, uninterpreted, disjoint functions. Hence,
for instance, a type definition for lists
type (α ) list = Cons of α ∗ α list | Nil
generates logical declarations for a constant Nil and a binary
function Cons, and the two assumptions
assume ∀x,y. Cons(x,y) 6= Nil.
assume ∀x,y,x’,y’.
(x = x’ ∧y = y’)↔ Cons(x,y) = Cons(x’,y’).
Each constructor also defines a predicate symbol that
may be used in formulas. Not all formulas can be trans-
lated to first-order-logic; for example, equalities between
functional values cannot be translated and are rejected.
Evaluation We have typechecked all the examples of this
paper and a few large programs. Table 1 summarizes our re-
sults; for each example, it gives the number of lines of typed
F# code, of generated F# interfaces, and of declarations in
RCF interfaces, plus typechecking time, and the number of
proof obligations passed to Z3. Since F# programmers are
expected to write interfaces anyway, the line difference be-
tween RCF and F# declarations roughly indicates the addi-
tional annotation burden of our approach.
The first row is for typechecking our symbolic imple-
mentations of lists, cryptography, and networking libraries.
The second row is an extension of the access control ex-
ample of Section 2; the next three rows are variants of the
MAC protocol of Section 3. The final row implements the
protocol described next in Section 6.
The examples in this paper are small programs designed
to exercise the features of our type system; our results in-
dicate that typechecking is fast and that annotations are not
too demanding. In comparison with an earlier tool FS2PV
that compiles F# code to ProVerif [Bhargavan et al., 2007],
our typechecker succeeds on examples with recursive func-
tions, such as the last row in Table 1, where ProVerif fails
to terminate. We expect our method to scale better to larger
examples, since we can typecheck one module at a time,
rather than construct a large ProVerif model. On the other
hand, FS2PV requires no type annotations, and ProVerif can
also prove injective correspondences and equivalence-based
properties [Blanchet et al., 2008].
6 Application: Flexible Signatures
We illustrate the controlled usage of cryptographic sig-
natures with the same key for different intents, or different
protocols. Such reuse is commonplace in practice (at least
for long-term keys) but it is also a common source of er-
rors (see Abadi and Needham [1996]), and it complicates
protocol verification.
The main risk is to issue ambiguous signatures. As an in-
formal design principle, one should ensure that, whenever
a signature is issued, (1) its content follows from the cur-
rent protocol step; and (2) its content cannot be interpreted
otherwise, by any other protocol that may rely on the same
key. To this end, one may for instance sign nonces, iden-
tities, session identifiers, and tags as well as the message
payloads to make the signature more specific.
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Our example is adapted from protocol code for XML
digital signatures, as prescribed in web services security
standards [Eastlake et al., 2002, Nadalin et al., 2004].
These signatures consist of an XML ”signature informa-
tion”, which represents a list of (hashed) elements covered
by the signature, together with a binary ”signature value”,
a signed cryptographic hash of the signature information.
Web services normally treat received signed-information
lists as sets, and only check that these sets cover selected el-
ements of the message—possibly fewer than those signed,
to enable partial erasure as part of intermediate message
processing. This flexibility induces protocol weaknesses in
some configurations of services. For instance, by providing
carefully-crafted inputs, an adversary may cause a naive ser-
vice to sign more than intended, and then use this signature
(in another XML context) to gain access to another service.
For simplicity, we only consider a single key and two in-
terpretations of messages. We first declare types for these
interpretations (either requests or responses) and their net-
work representation (a list of elements plus their joint sig-
nature).
type id = int // representing message GUIDs
type events =
Request of id ∗ string // id and payload
| Response of id ∗ id ∗ string // id, request id, and payload
type element =
IdHdr of id // Unique message identifier
| InReplyTo of id // Identifier for some related messsage
| RequestBody of string // Payload for a request message
| ResponseBody of string // Payload for a response message
|Whatever of string // Any other elements
type siginfo = element list
type msg = siginfo ∗ dsig
Depending on their constructor, signed elements can
be interpreted for requests (RequestBody), responses,
(InReplyTo, ResponseBody), both (IdHdr), or none
(Whatever). We formally capture this intent in the type dec-
laration of the information that is signed:
type verified = x:siginfo{
(∀id, b.(Mem(IdHdr(id),x) ∧Mem(RequestBody(b),x))
⇒Request(id,b) )
∧ (∀id, req, b.(Mem(IdHdr(id),x) ∧Mem(ResponseBody(b),x)
∧Mem(InReplyTo(req),x))⇒Response(id,req,b) ) }
Thus, the logical meaning of a signature is a conjunction of
message interpretations, each guarded by a series of condi-
tions on the elements included in the signature information.
We only present code for requests. We use the following
declarations for the key pair and for message processing.
private val sk: verified privkey
val vk: verified pubkey
private val mkMessage: verified→msg
private val isMessage: msg→verified
type request = (id:id ∗ b:string){ Request(id,b) }
val isRequest: msg→ request
private val mkPlainRequest: request→msg
private val mkRequest: request→siginfo→msg
To accept messages as a genuine requests, we just verify
its signature and find two relevant elements in the list:
let isMessage (msg,dsig) =
unpickle (rsasha1Verify vk (pickle msg) dsig)
let isRequest msg =
let si = isMessage msg in (find id si, find request si)
For producing messages, we may define (and type):
let mkMessage siginfo = (siginfo, rsasha1 sk (pickle siginfo))
let mkPlainRequest (id,payload) =
mkMessage (IdHdr(id)::RequestBody(payload)::[])
let mkRequest (id,payload) extra : msg =
check harmless extra;
mkMessage (IdHdr(id)::RequestBody(payload)::extra)
While mkPlainRequest uses a fixed list of signed elements,
mkRequest takes further elements to sign as an extra pa-
rameter. In both cases, typing the list with the refinement
type verified ensures (1) Request(id,b), from its input refine-
ment type; and (2) that the list does not otherwise match the
two clauses within verified. For mkRequest, this requires
some dynamic input validation check harmless extra where
check harmless is declared as
val check harmless: x: siginfo→ r: unit {
( ∀s. not(Mem(IdHdr(s),x)))
∧ ( ∀s. not(Mem(InReplyTo(s),x)))
∧ ( ∀s. not(Mem(RequestBody(s),x)))
∧ ( ∀s. not(Mem(ResponseBody(s),x))) }
and recursively defined as
let rec check harmless m = match m with
| IdHdr( ):: → failwith "bad"
| InReplyTo( ):: → failwith "bad"
| RequestBody( ):: → failwith "bad"
| ResponseBody( ):: → failwith "bad"
| ::xs→check harmless xs
| []→ ()
On the other hand, the omission of this check, or an error in
its implementation, would be caught as a type error.
7 Related Work
Type systems for information flow have been developed
for code written in many languages, including Java [My-
ers, 1999] and ML [Pottier and Simonet, 2003]. Further
works extend them with support for cryptographic mech-
anisms [for example, Askarov et al., 2006, Vaughan and
Zdancewic, 2007, Fournet and Rezk, 2008]. These sys-
tems seek to guarantee non-interference properties for pro-
grams annotated with confidentiality and integrity levels. In
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contrast, our system seeks to guarantee assertion-based se-
curity properties, commonly used in authorization policies
and cryptographic protocol specifications, and disregards
implicit flows of information.
Type systems with logical effects, such as ours, have also
been used to reason about the security of models of dis-
tributed systems. For instance, type systems for variants of
the pi-calculus [Fournet et al., 2007b, Cirillo et al., 2007]
and the λ -calculus [Cirillo et al., 2007] can guarantee that
expressions follow their access control policies. Type sys-
tems for variants of the pi-calculus, such as Cryptyc [Gor-
don and Jeffrey, 2002], have been used to verify secrecy, au-
thentication, and authorization properties of protocol mod-
els. Unlike our tool, none of these typecheckers operates on
source code.
The tool CSur has been used to check cryptographic
properties of C code using an external first-order-logic
theorem-prover [Goubault-Larrecq and Parrennes, 2005]; it
does not rely on typing.
Our approach of annotating programs with pre- and post-
conditions has similarities with extended static checkers
used for program verification, such as ESC/Java [Flana-
gan et al., 2002], Spec# [Barnett et al., 2005], and ES-
C/Haskell [Xu, 2006]. Such checkers cannot verify security
properties of cryptographic code, but they can find many
other kinds of errors. For instance, Poll and Schubert [2007]
use ESC/Java2 [Cok and Kiniry, 2004] to verify that an SSH
implementation in Java conforms to a state machine specifi-
cation. Combining approaches can be even more effective,
for instance, Hubbers et al. [2003] generate implementation
code from a verified protocol model and check conformance
using an extended static checker.
In comparison with these approaches, we propose sub-
typing rules that capture notions of public and tainted
data, and we provide functional encodings of cryptography.
Hence, we achieve typability for opponents representing ac-
tive attackers. Also, we use only stable formulas: in any
given run, a formula that holds at some point also holds
for the rest of the run; this enables a simple treatment of
programs with concurrency and side-effects. (This would
not be the case, say, with predicates on the current state of
shared mutable memory.)
One direction for further research is to avoid the need
for refinement type annotations, by inference. A potential
starting point is a recent paper [Rondon et al., 2008], which
presents a polymorphic system of refinement types for ML,
quite related to RCF, together with a type inference algo-
rithm based on predicate abstraction.
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A Logic
Formally, our typed calculus is parameterized by the
choice of an authorization logic, in the sense that it relies
only on a series of abstract properties of the logic, rather
than on a particular syntax or semantics for logic formulas.
Experimentally, our prototype implementation uses ordi-
nary first order logic with equality, with terms that include
all the values M, N of Section 2 (including functional val-
ues). During typechecking, this logic is partially mapped
to the SIMPLIFY input of Z3, with the implementation re-
striction that no term should include any functional value.
(This restriction prevents discrepancies on term equalities
between the calculus and the logic.)
We use the following abstract syntax.








p(M1, . . . ,Mn) atomic predicate
M = M′ equation
True
4= ∀x.x = x
False
4= ¬True
M 6= M′ 4= ¬(M = M′)
(C⇒C′) 4= (¬C∨C′)
(C⇔C′) 4= (C⇒C′)∧ (C′⇒C)
As usual with first order logic, the logical terms may include
both variables and function symbols (coded as datatype con-
structors). In addition, they may include function abstrac-
tions fun x→ A, considered up to consistent renaming of
bound variables. (These functions are inert in the logic; they
can be compared but not applied.)
Other interesting logics for our verification purposes in-
clude logics with “says” modalities [Abadi et al., 1993],
which may be used to give a logical account of principals
and partial trust by typing [Fournet et al., 2007b].
B Semantics and Safety of Expressions
This appendix formally defines the operational seman-
tics of expressions, and the notion of expression safety, as
introduced in Section 2.
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An expression can be thought of as denoting a structure,
given as follows. We define the meaning of assume C and
assert C in terms of a structure being statically safe.
Let an elementary expression, e, be any expression apart
from a let, restriction, fork, message send, or an assumption.
Structures and Static Safety:
∏i∈1..n Ai
4= ()  A1  . . .  An
L ::= {} | (let x = L in B)
S ::= (νa1) . . .(νa`)
(( ∏
i∈1..m
assume Ci)  ( ∏
j∈1..n
M j!N j)  ( ∏
k∈1..o
Lk{ek}))
Let structure S be statically safe if and only if, for all p ∈
1..o and C, if ep = assert C then {C1, . . . ,Cm} `C.
Heating: AV A′
Axioms A≡ A′ are read as both AV A′ and A′V A.
AV A
AV A′′ if AV A′ and A′V A′′
AV A′⇒ let x = A in BV let x = A′ in B
AV A′⇒ (νa)AV (νa)A′
AV A′⇒ (A  B)V (A′  B)
AV A′⇒ (B  A)V (B  A′)
()  A≡ A
M!NVM!N  ()
assume CV assume C  ()
a /∈ fn(A′)⇒ A′  ((νa)A)V (νa)(A′  A)
a /∈ fn(A′)⇒ ((νa)A)  A′V (νa)(A  A′)
a /∈ fn(B)⇒ let x = (νa)A in BV (νa)let x = A in B
(A  A′)  A′′ ≡ A  (A′  A′′)
(A  A′)  A′′V (A′  A)  A′′
let x = (A  A′) in B≡ A  (let x = A′ in B)
Reduction: A→ A′
(fun x→ A) N→ A{N/x}
(let (x1,x2) = (N1,N2) in A)→ A{N1/x1}{N2/x2}
(match M with h x→ A else B)→{








let x = M in A→ A{M/x}
A→ A′⇒ let x = A in B→ let x = A′ in B
A→ A′⇒ (νa)A→ (νa)A′
A→ A′⇒ (A  B)→ (A′  B)
A→ A′⇒ (B  A)→ (B  A′)
A→ A′ if AV B,B→ B′,B′V A′
Expression Safety:
An expression A is safe if and only if, for all A′ and S, if
A→∗ A′ and A′V S, then S is statically safe.
C Example Code
We provide the complete interface and implementation







type prin = string
type event = Send of (prin ∗ prin ∗ string) | Leak of prin
type (;a:prin,b:prin) content = x:string{ Send(a,b,x) }




(prin∗prin, a:prin ∗ b:prin ∗ k:(;a,b) content hkey) Db.t
val genKey: prin→prin→unit
private val getKey: a:
string→b:string→ ((;a,b) content) hkey
assume ∀a,b,x. ( Leak(a) )⇒Send(a,b,x)
val leak:
a:prin→b:prin→ (unit{ Leak(a) }) ∗ ((;a,b) content) hkey
val addr : (prin ∗ prin ∗ string ∗ hmac, unit) addr
private val check:








open Crypto // Crypto Library
open Net // Networking Library
// Simple F# types for principals, events, payloads, and messages:
type prin = string
type event = Send of (prin ∗ prin ∗ string) | Leak of prin
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type content = string
type message = (prin ∗ prin ∗ string ∗ hmac) pickled
// Key database:
let hkDb : ((prin∗prin),(prin∗prin∗(content hkey))) Db.t =
Db.create ()
let mkContentKey (a:prin) (b:prin) : content hkey =
mkHKey()
let genKey a b =
let k = mkContentKey a b in
Db.insert hkDb (a,b) (a,b,k)
let getKey a b =
let a’,b’,sk = Db.select hkDb (a,b) in
if (a’,b’) = (a,b) then sk else failwith "select failed"
// Key compromise:
let leak a b =
assume (Leak(a)); ((),getKey a b)
// removed: assume (Leak(b));
// Server code:
let addr : (prin ∗ prin ∗ string ∗ hmac, unit) addr =
http "http://localhost:7000/pwdmac"
let check b m =
let a,b’,text,h = unpickle m in
if b = b’ then
let k = getKey a b in
(a,
unpickle(hmacsha1Verify k (pickle (text:string)) h))
else failwith "Not the intended recipient"
let server b =
let c = listen addr in
let (a,text) = check b (recv c) in
assert(Send(a,b,text))
// Client code:
let make a b s =
pickle (a,b,s,hmacsha1 (getKey a b) (pickle s))
let client a b text =
assume (Send(a,b,text));
let c = connect addr in
send c (make a b text)
// Execute one instance of the protocol:
let = genKey "A" "B"
let = fork (fun (u:unit)→client "A" "B" "Hello")
let = server "B"
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